Abstract. We define the plutocratic bias as the difference between the inflation measured according to the current official CPI and a democratic index in which all households receive the same weight. (i) We estimate that during the 1990s the plutocratic bias in Spain amounts to 0.055 per cent per year, or about one third of the classical substitution bias estimated by the Boskin Commission for the U.S. (ii) We find that a 16-dimensional commodity space can be conveniently reduced to 3 dimensions, consisting of a luxury good and two necessities. The price behavior of these 3 goods provides a convincing explanation of the oscillations experimented by the plutocratic bias. (iii) Finally, the fact that the plutocratic bias is positive during this period, implies that the change in money income inequality is between 2 and 5 per cent greater than the change in real income inequality. We study the robustness of these results to the time period considered and to the definition of the group index which serves as an alternative to the CPI. We estimate that during the 1980s and the second part of the 1970s in Spain, the plutocratic bias is 0.033 and 0.239 per cent per year, respectively.
INTRODUCTION
In all countries, the official CPI (Consumer Price Index), which is meant to be representative for a certain reference population, is a fixed-weight price index. At least since Konüs (1924) , economists have known that a fixed-weight CPI suffers from a "substitution bias" relative to a true cost-of-living index which, instead of maintaining constant the budget shares of the households represented in the index, maintains constant their living standards or welfare levels. But according to the review of the literature carried out by a U.S. Senate Commission headed by Michael Boskin (Boskin et al., 1996) , this is not all that is wrong with the U. The way elementary price quotations are aggregated within each geographic zone, or the "lower level substitution" problem, is responsible for a bias of 0.25 per cent per year.
(3) Consumers adjust their behavior on where to buy in response to price differences between the outlets which happen to be sampled by the BLS and other outlets which are competing with them by lowering prices. The outlet substitution bias due to the failure of the CPI to reflect this aspect of consumer behavior, is estimated at 0.10 per cent per year. The last two sources of bias have to do with the alleged failure of the BLS (4) to take fully into account the quality changes experienced in many sectors of the economy, and (5) to introduce in a timely fashion the new products constantly appearing on the market. These two sources together are supposed to cause a bias of 0.60 per cent per year.
Thus, the Boskin Commission estimates that, on average, during the last few decades the U.S. CPI has been overstating the inflation by 1.1 per cent per year. This bias This research has profited from financial support of the Research Department of "la Caixa". might seem small. However, when compounded over time, the implications for (i) the public deficit created through an indexed budget, (ii) the wage bargaining process and the determination of the nominal interest rates in the private sector, and (iii) the measurement of the economic performance in real terms, are little short of catastrophic.
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Be this as it may, the fact is that the report has become already very influential.
2 This does not mean, of course, that it has escaped criticism. Some critics question the Commission's analysis of each and every one of the five sources of bias (Moulton et al., 1998) . Others point out toward neglected issues and, in particular, the scant attention paid to distributional issues to which we now turn our attention -see, e.g., Pollak (1998) , Deaton (1998), and Madrick (1997) .
In the CPI context, the issues raised by the heterogeneity of the population are usually identified by asking "Whose cost-of-living index?," a question which is seen to contain three issues in Pollak (1998) . "How many cost-of-living indexes?," "Beer or champagne?," and "What type of group indexes?" The first issue refers to whether we should have different indexes for different groups -rich and poor, elderly and nonelderly, urban and rural, etc. The second issue refers to the selection of the appropriate set of items, qualities and outlets that are to be reflected in the index.
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Assume that the population of households (individuals or consumers) for whom a representative index must be constructed has been decided, and that a solution has been found for the beer-vs-champagne issue. The third issue, which is the topic of this paper, originates with the nature of the CPI as a group index. Given the commodity space and a household budget survey representative of the reference population, we can use 1 For an evaluation of these sources of bias in the measurement of inflation through the official Spanish price index and its implications for the Spanish economy, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b) .
2 As Diewert (1998) puts it: ". . . with a total budget of $25,000, Boskin, Dulberger, Griliches, Gordon and Jorgenson have probably written the most important measurement paper of the century in terms of its impact: Every statistical agency in the world is revaluating its price measurement techniques as a direct result of their report and the widespread publicity it has received."
3 Against the view of the Boskin Commission and Diewert (1995) that the "lower level substitution" problem is primarily a problem of choosing an appropriate formula for combining the prices of items, Pollak (1995 Pollak ( , 1998 argues that it is primarily a problem of selecting the "items" to be priced, and reflects fundamental ambiguities in the meaning of "goods," "commodities," and "items" at theoretical and empirical levels. each household's budget shares as the fixed weights for the construction of householdspecific price indexes. Since Prais (1958) , we know that the CPI is the weighted average of such individual price indexes with weights proportional to each household's total expenditures. Because richer households weigh more than poor ones, Prais baptized the CPI as a plutocratic price index. The question is whether we can think of a better alternative to this particular construction.
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In this paper, we defend that the so-called democratic index, in which all households receive the same weight, is an option worth pursuing. Thus, we define the plutocratic bias as the difference between the inflation measured according to the current official CPI and a democratic index. We offer two reasons for being interested in such a concept.
In the first place, it is always interesting to know who suffers the greatest inflation:
those households with the largest total expenditures, or those at the bottom of the distribution, in which case we would say that prices have behaved in an anti-rich or an anti-poor manner, respectively. In the first (second) case we should expect that the mean inflation weighted by the total household expenditures would be greater (smaller) than the simple mean. Thus, the plutocratic bias would be positive or negative according to whether prices have behaved in an anti-rich or in an anti-poor manner, respectively -this idea can be traced back to Fry and Pashardes (1985) .
In the second place, when two distributions of household expenditure, or income, are expressed at constant prices using household-specific price indexes, the change in nominal income inequality -which is the magnitude usually estimated in the empirical literature-is seen to be equal to the change in real income inequality plus a price term which captures the distributional impact of price changes. 5 Knowledge of the sign of the plutocratic bias takes us a long way in the direction of knowing the sign of the price term. Thus, whether a given change in money income inequality is smaller (larger)
4 As pointed out by Pollak (1998) , the first two issues are given a cursory treatment in footnote 2 and page 71 of Boskin et al. (1996) . The Boskin Commission never addresses the third issue directly, although Pollak selects some passages of its report which appear to reflect an implicit judgement that the CPI ought to be a plutocratic price index. 5 The idea that price movements should be included in intertemporal income inequality comparisons was originally suggested by Iyengar and Battacharya (1965) . Subsequently, in a social welfare context Muellbauer (1974) showed that under general assumptions on individual preferences real income inequality comparisons are not price independent.
than the socially relevant change in real income inequality depends to a large extent on whether the plutocratic bias is positive (negative).
Nevertheless, the importance of this concept depends crucially on its empirical magnitude. Our main result is that the plutocratic bias in Spain during the 1990s is equal to 0.055 per cent per year -or about one third of the classical substitution bias estimated by the Boskin Commission for the U.S. Nonetheless, averaging magnitudes of different signs underestimates the real importance of this bias. The bias in specific years
oscillates from a maximum of 0.150 to a minimum of −0.080 per cent per year. Interestingly, neither the sign nor the magnitude of the bias in a given subperiod depends on the magnitude of the inflation in that subperiod. Using the total expenditures elasticities estimated in an Engel curve system, we find that a 16-dimensional commodity space can be conveniently reduced to 3 dimensions, consisting of a luxury good and two necessities. The price behavior of these 3 goods provides a convincing explanation of the oscillations experimented by the plutocratic bias. Finally, the fact that the plutocratic bias is positive, implies that the gap between the changes in nominal and real household expenditures inequality during the 1990s is between 2 and 5 per cent, depending on the inequality measure and the importance we give to the scale economies in consumption within the household.
The paper studies the robustness of these results in two dimensions. In the first place, we estimate the plutocratic bias for the 1980s and the second part of the 1970s in Spain.
We find that, on average, the bias is small in the first case and large in the second: 0.033 and 0.239 per cent per year, respectively. 6 In the second place, we ask what would have been the bias in the measurement of inflation if instead of using the plutocratic CPI we were to use a group index equal to the weighted mean of the household-specific indexes with weights proportional to the household size. We find that such a bias for the 1990s, the 1980s and the second part of the 1970s would be equal to 0.088, 0.015 and 0.223
per cent per year, respectively.
6 The sign and the magnitude of the bias for these two periods are consistent with previous findings about the fact that the decrease in the real household's total expenditures inequality is greater than the decrease in the money inequality -see Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo (1996) , and Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre (1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the essentials on individual and aggregate price indexes. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the plutocratic bias in Spain during the 1990s, while Section 4 studies the implications for total household expenditures inequality measurement. Section 5 is devoted to the robustness of those results during previous periods, and the use of weighted group indexes with weights proportional to household size. Section 6 summarizes and discusses the political implications of our results in a heavily indexed economy. 
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP INDEXES

Individual Price Indexes
When the reference utility is the utility-maximizing level at prices p 0 , denoted by u
Given a reference commodity vector, q h , we can define a statistical price index (SPI) as the ratio of the cost of acquiring q h at prices p t and p 0 ,
7 An SPI can also be written as a weighted average of individual-commodity indexes. Let w h i0 be the good-i household budget share at prices p 0 , i.e.,
When q h = q h 0 , the utility-maximizing consumption bundle at prices p 0 , we say that the SPI (p t , p 0 ; q
A fundamental theorem in Konüs (1924) establishes that, under general assumptions, the Laspeyres SPI provides an upper bound to the Laspeyres COLI,
Equality is obtained when preferences are of the Leontief type, i.e., when there is no substitution between goods.
The CPI
Define the vector of aggregate quantities bought in situation 0 by Q 0 = (Q 10 , . . . , Q I0 ),
The aggregate Laspeyres SPI -for period t based on period 0-is then defined as follows:
However, the CPI actually computed by statistical agencies is not exactly an aggregate price index of the type defined in equation (1). The reason is that individual behavior is typically investigated by means of a household budget survey conducted in a period τ prior to the index base period 0. As it is shown in the Appendix, the CPI based on period 0 is an aggregate SPI defined by
This is what the BLS calls a modified Laspeyres aggregate price index (Moulton, 1996) .
What are the normative bases for such a construction? To answer this question we need to define a set of household-specific modified Laspeyres price indexes: 
Konüs theorem assures that, for each h,
, but it says nothing about the ratio of the Laspeyres indexes which give rise to an individual CPI. However, the household budget survey collection period τ is typically not far apart from the base year 0 of the CPI system. Thus, under the assumption that the substitution bias
, we have that a household-specific CPI provides an upper bound to a modified Laspeyres COLI. As shown in the Appendix,
where
Thus, only under the assumption that, for a sufficiently large number of households,
then the aggregate CPI provides an upper bound to a plutocratic-weighted mean of modified Laspeyres COLIs:
Otherwise it would instead provide a lower bound. Nonetheless, the proximity of the theoretical construct -i.e., a COLI-and the empirical counterpart -i.e., the CPI-constitutes a rather remarkable situation.
Under the same assumption, the simple mean of modified Laspeyres SPIs constitutes an upper bound to the simple mean of modified Laspeyres COLIs.
THE PLUTOCRATIC BIAS
The Data
In order to estimate the plutocratic bias defined below, we need to construct a series of household-specific Laspeyres price indexes. For that purpose, we use the following two pieces of publicly available information in Spain: the 1990-91 household-budget survey (EPF) used to estimate the weights of the official CPI, and a set of price subindexes at a certain level of spatial and commodity disaggregation. For any commodity breakdown, it is possible to reconstruct the official CPI series using an appropriately defined aggregate budget shares vector. Similarly, defining a budget share vector for every household in the 1990-91 sample, we can obtain a series of household-specific CPIs for any commodity breakdown. In principle, the only difference between alternative specifications of the commodity space, is that the dispersion of the set of individual CPIs should be greater the greater the disaggregation level of the price information used in their construction. Unfortunately, in spite of using the same informational basis as the INE -namely, the 1990-91 EPF-we find several small discrepancies between our estimates of the aggregate budget share vectors and those published by the INE -for the details, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b) . Thus, the CPI series which we can reconstruct vary slightly depending on the different commodity breakdowns characterizing the price information we use. In Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b) we find that the specification consisting of the 21 food rúbricas at the Autonomous Community level, and the 32 non-food subgrupos at the provincial level outperforms the rest of the alternatives according to various statistical and economic criteria.
It should be emphasized that our series of household-specific price indexes defined over this 53 commodity space differ from the series underlying the official CPI in two ways. In the first place, there are a number of aspects in the official definition of total household expenditures for which we believe there are superior alternatives. We refer to:
(i) the definition of housing expenditures for households occupying non-rental housing;
(ii) the inclusion of imputations for home production, wages in kind and subsidized meals, and (iii) the estimation of annual food and drink expenditures using all the available information on bulk purchases in the 1990-91 EPF. The joint impact of these modifications is important: according to Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999b) , the official CPI understates the true Spanish inflation from 1992 to January of 1998 in 0.241 per cent per year.
In the second place, it should be noticed that the Spanish CPI is not the modified Laspeyres price index defined in equation (2), which takes as a reference the mean quantity vector actually acquired by the EPF households at the time they were inter- If we normalize this series at prices of period 0 = 1992, we can obtain the conceptually correct CPI, that is,
For the details of this construction, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999a) . This series of modified Laspeyres price indexes is available at http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/epf.html.
A Definition of the Plutocratic Bias
We will divide the period Winter 1991-January 1998 in the 7 subperiods shown on table 1 below. For each h we define the inflation (or deflation) caused by the evolution of prices in a given subperiod by:
The distribution of individual inflations in each subperiod is denoted by π π
, where T = Jan98. The aggregate inflation for the population as a whole according to the plutocratic scheme
For the democratic scheme,
where we expect the plutocratic mean of individual inflations in the plutocratic case to be greater than the democratic mean. That is, B t or B are positive (negative) according to whether the price change in the corresponding time interval is anti-rich (anti-poor).
The Main Findings
In the first two columns of The main findings are the followings three: (1) For the period as a whole, B is positive and equal to 0.055 per cent per year. This is, approximately, one third of the substitution bias estimated by the Boskin Commission for the U.S. economy, which is equal to 0.15 per cent per year. (2) Price behavior is not uniform over the entire period:
B t is negative during 1994 and 1995, indicating that during these two years prices have caused relatively more damage to the poor than to the rich households. (3) Neither the sign nor the magnitude of B t in a given period depends on whether inflation is large or small during that period.
An Economic Interpretation
Which goods are primarily consumed by the poor or the rich households? To answer this question, we must begin by recognizing the fact that, in a heterogeneous world, total expenditures of households with different characteristics are not directly comparable. Following Buhmann et al. (1988) and Coulter et al. (1992a Coulter et al. ( , 1992b , we adopt an equivalence scale model in which scale economies in consumption depend only on household size, s h , and adjusted total household expenditures are defined by
When θ = 0, adjusted expenditures coincide with unadjusted household expenditures, while if θ = 1, it becomes per capita household expenditures. Taking a single adult as the reference type, the expression s θ can be interpreted as the number of equivalent adults in a household of size s. Thus, the greater the equivalence elasticity θ, the smaller the scale economies in consumption or, in other words, the larger the number of equivalent adults. b "Non-alcoholic Drinks" and "Other Food Products."
In Table 2 , we present the budget shares for the quintiles of the distribution of adjusted total expenditures for an intermediate value of θ = 1 2 . The commodity space consists of 16 goods, classified in three groups according to whether their total expenditures elasticity is greater than 1 (luxuries), considerably smaller than 1 (necessities I, dominated by Food expenditures), or weakly smaller than 1 (necessities II, dominated by Housing expenditures). The total expenditure elasticities are estimated at the mean of the variables in the following system of Engel-curve regressions: Autonomous Community of residence). In Figure 1 we display the joint distribution of the individual budget shares for these three goods and the logarithm of the adjusted total household expenditures, 12 the last panel shows the estimated Engel curves (trimming the 1 percent tails off the support of the adjusted household expenditures).
[Insert Figure 1] Intuitively, the evolution of prices would tend to damage to relatively greater extent the richer households over the poorer ones according to whether the luxury good or the necessities experience the greatest relative increase. For the entire period, the inflation experienced by the luxury good and the two necessities are 31.59, 21.08, and 38.46 index points, respectively. In Figure 2 we represent the evolution of the inter-annual inflation of the three goods in relation to the general inflation as well as the inter-annual B t , t = January 1992,. . .,January 1998.
[Insert Figure 2] In spite of the fact that the second necessity shows the stronger price growth, the behavior of the luxury good and the first necessity is the main explanatory force behind 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT
The Change in Money and Real Inequality
Let us assume that we want to compare the household income or expenditures distri- 
For any H ≥ 2, let I :
H → be any convenient inequality index satisfying continuity, S-concavity, scale independence and replication population invariance. The change in money income inequality, ∆M , can be expressed as the sum of two terms:
where ∆R = I(x t ) − I(x 0,t ) is the change in real income inequality and ∆P = I(x 0,t ) − I(x t ) captures the distributional impact of price changes on inequality measurement according to the households' preferences at period 0. 13 ¿From a social point of view, we 13 We could have expressed the distribution in situation t at prices p 0 by using an appropriate Paassche type price index. In this case, ∆P = I(x t ) − I(x t,0 ) would have measured the distributional impact of price changes according to the households' preferences at t.
are primarily interested in the sign of ∆R. However, in the absence of household-specific price indexes -which is the dominant situation in the empirical literature-researchers usually measure only ∆M . Therefore, it is important to know the relationship between ∆R and ∆M when the change from p 0 to p t is not neutral, that is, when ∆P is different from 0.
The compensating variation introduced by Hicks (1940) , CV h , is the amount of money that household h must receive in compensation for the price change from p 0 to p t , i.e.,
As before, the plutocratic bias is defined as
Intuitively, when B t > 0, for example, household inflation π h t tends to be greater for the rich than for the poor households. Taking equation (5) into account, in this case we expect the compensating variation to be also greater for the rich than for the poor households.
Given that x 0,t = x 0 + CV, where CV = (CV 1 , . .
. , CV H ), as long as I(CV) > I(x 0 )
we have that I(x 0,t ) > I(x 0 ) or, in other terms, ∆P > 0. 14 In view of (4), we expect that ∆M > < ∆R as long as B t > < 0. This means that when, for instance, B t > 0 -so that the price change from p 0 to p t is anti-rich-then the term ∆P is positive and ∆M > ∆R. In this case, (i) if the normatively significant term ∆R is positive, so that there has been an increase in real income inequality, then the change in money income inequality would overstate the socially relevant magnitude. (ii) Conversely, if ∆R < 0, then ∆M would understate the reduction in real income inequality.
Results
Let us identify situation with the Winter 1991 and t with T , i.e., January 1998 -so that, as before, we drop the subscript from B. Since, as we have seen, B = 0.055 per cent per year during this period, we expect the term ∆P to be positive. To verify this circumstance, we must select an inequality index.
14 Note that the reverse need not be the case. It might be that I(x 0,t ) > I(x 0 ) because the vector CV is very unequal and there are a lot of re-orderings between x t and CV. A re-ordering between x 0 and CV means that, for a pair of households h and h ,
e., the inflation would be greater for the rich than for the poor household and the plutocratic mean of π π π could be smaller than the democratic mean. Thus, in spite of I(x 0,t ) > I(x 0 ), we can have that B t < 0.
It is well known that the Generalized Entropy family of inequality indexes are the only measures of relative inequality that satisfy the usual normative properties required from any inequality index and, in addition, are decomposable by population subgroups -see, e.g., Shorrocks (1984) . The family can be described by means of the following convenient cardinalization:
where y(θ) is the distribution of adjusted total household expenditures defined in equation (3), and µ(·) stands for the mean of the distribution. The parameter c summarizes the sensitivity of I c in different parts of the total household expenditures distribution:
the more positive (negative) c is, the more sensitive I c is to differences at the top (bottom) of the distribution -see Cowell and Kuga (1981) . I 1 is the original Theil index, while I 0 is the mean logarithmic deviation.
In Table 3 we present the estimates for ∆P c (θ) for the parameter values c = −1, 0, 1, 2 and θ = 0.0, 0.5, 1.0. These values have been estimated using 1,000 Bootstrap samples.
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In each Bootstrap sample we draw 21,155 households using stratified resampling according to the 260 strata in the original survey. For each (c, θ) pair, we obtain a Bootstrap distribution of 1,000 inequality measures. 
ROBUSTNESS
The Time Period
In this subsection we study the robustness of our results on the B trend in two different directions. In the first place, we consider the period covered by the two previous Spanish bases, respectively, and (iii) a series of adjustment factors for 60 goods at the national level provided by Catasús et al. (1986) for the first period, and for only 5 goods at the national level provided by García España and Serrano (1980) for the second period. The first thing to notice is that the Spanish inflation during the 1970s and 1980s is considerably greater than during the 1990s. However, as before, there is no relationship 16 For the 1980s, we had to work with a set of 52 goods which constitute the minimum common denominator between the 58 official rúbricas and the 60 goods in Catasús et al. (1986) . For the 1970s, the minimum common denominator is given by the 5 goods in García España and Serrano (1980) . For the details of these constructions, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999a) . Both series of modified Laspeyres price indexes are available at http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/epf.html. between the size of the aggregate inflation in a given subperiod and the sign or the magnitude of the plutocratic bias. As far as the 1980s is concerned, from 1983 to 1986
and from 1988 to 1989, B t < 0. The sum of these magnitudes is more than offset by the anti-rich price behavior during the remaining 3 subperiods. Thus, for the 1980s we To appreciate the variability of the plutocratic bias during the entire period considered in this paper, Figure 3 shows the evolution of the inter-annual (month to month) B t , t = January 1977, . . . , January 1998, as well as the inter-annual inflation rate. Regressing the bias in absolute value against inflation yields a nonsignificant coefficient (0.005 with a standard error of 0.006, using generalized least squares correcting for autocorrelation).
[Insert Figure 3] These results can be related to those obtained in previous papers about the distributional impact of price changes on household expenditures inequality measurement, where household expenditures are defined as total household expenditures net of the acquisition of some durables but inclusive of a number of expenditures which, although not included in the CPI definition, we believe are part of the best possible approximation to current consumption of private goods and services using the information available in the EPF. Using the inequality index I 1 (·) defined in equation (6), Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre (1999) point out that the term ∆P in equation (4) household expenditures inequality -which is equal to 27 per cent-is 37.7 per cent greater than the decrease in nominal household expenditures inequality; that is to say, during this period the distributional impact of price changes on inequality measurement is very important.
The Aggregation Scheme
In the second place, it is interesting to experiment with other aggregation schemes to map a distribution of individual inflations to an aggregate index. Given that the discipline of welfare economics is more interested in personal rather than household welfare, it is natural to ask for the consequences of estimating the inflation for the population as a whole as the weighted mean of individual inflations with weights proportional to household size. On Table 6 
CONCLUSIONS
In a country like Spain, a commodity basket of 471 goods is priced in each of the 52 provinces in order to construct the set of elementary price indexes which form the core of the current 1992 CPI system. We have been able to work in a 53 dimensional commodity space, consisting of the 21 food rúbricas at the 18 Autonomous Community level, and the 32 non-food subgrupos at the 52 province level. For such a commodity breakdown, we construct 21,155 household-specific Laspeyres price indexes representative of a 1990-91 population of about 11 million households. Because of the fixed-weight nature of our construction, the individual inflation variation we observe during the Winter 1991-January 1998 period is the consequence of the price variation publicly disseminated by the INE in this 53 commodity space.
How can we grasp the distributional consequences of such a complex multidimensional process? In this paper we propose a procedure which combines three elements. In the first place, whether price behavior in a given period hurts relatively more the rich or the poor households can be expressed in terms of a single scalar: the so-called plutocratic bias, incurred when we measure inflation using the current plutocratic CPI instead of using an alternative group index in which all households weight equally. In the second place, the estimation of an Engel curve system in a 16 goods commodity space, allows us to reduce the size of the price universe to only three dimensions: a luxury good and two necessities with considerably different total expenditures elasticities. Price behavior at this level provides an intelligible explanation of the sign and magnitude of the plutocratic bias. Finally, the change in money income inequality -which is the only magnitude usually estimated in the empirical literature on income inequality-is seen to be equal to the change in real income inequality -which is the socially relevant magnitude-and a price term which captures the distributional impact of price changes according to consumers' preferences as manifested via their budget share vectors in a given moment in time. The price term, and hence the gap between the change in money and real income inequality, depends on the size and magnitude of the plutocratic bias.
Knowing the plutocratic bias is also important for two other topics in positive economics. On one hand, in Spain -like in many other countries-the CPI is not really a modified Laspeyres price index. Thus, one can define a "Laspeyres bias" as the difference between measuring inflation using an appropriate Laspeyres type index or using the CPI actually constructed in these countries. As shown in Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999d) few staples may cause havoc in the standard of living of the majority of the population.
In our opinion, it is advisable to estimate the plutocratic bias on a regular basis. For this and other purposes, we recommend that statistical agencies in charge of the CPI compute and make available, at least annually, a set of household-specific price indexes.
This idea has the following four advantages:
1. We expect that the farther down we go towards the elementary price level, the greater will be the dispersion of the distribution of household-specific price indexes. However, we would also expect a larger number of zero expenditures in most households.
Therefore, there are advantages and disadvantages in enlarging the commodity space.
Given that, for confidentiality reasons, the price information at the elementary level is not publicly available, the statistical agencies are the only institutions in a position to determine the optimal disaggregation level for the construction of individual price indexes.
2.
Given the set of (official) individual price indexes, anyone -except the statistical agencies themselves, which should not become involved in political issues-can study -Madrick (1997) and Deaton (1998) , for instance-conjecture that new goods and goods affected by quality effects are disproportionately consumed by the rich. In our own terms, this implies that the set of household-specific price indexes after the correction of this bias should exhibit a smaller plutocratic bias. Are these critics slightly anti-rich.
correct? In Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999f) , we have put this idea to a test by combining the structure of the bias for the U.S. economy with the consumer behavior of Spanish households as given in the 1990-91, 1980-81 and 1973-74 EPFs. The plutocratic bias after the correction of the quality bias in the intervals (Winter 1991, January 1998), (Winter 1981 , Winter 1991 ), (1973 -1974 , Winter 1981 ) is 0.035. 0.024, and 0.227 per cent per year, respectively. Since, as we have seen, the plutocratic bias before the correction is 0.055, 0.033 and 0.240 per cent per year, we can conclude that there is some evidence indicating that the point made by those social critics is well taken.
4. Muellbauer (1976a) indicates that he does not regard the historical bias of inflation as the most important issue. Given that keeping down inflation is such an important policy goal, it is natural that any government should be very sensitive to the effects of policy change on the official CPI. Thus, the aggregate weights are the forces which push government policy affecting relative prices into particular directions. Within this context, armed with a set of publicly available household-specific price indexes, both the government (and others) would be in a position to evaluate, both ex ante and ex post, the distributional consequences on the CPI of certain policy actions.
Some would argue that, given the public opinion's potential sensitivity to the distributional issues embedded in the construction of a single CPI, officially publishing a set of household-specific price indexes would ultimately affect the credibility of the CPI 
which is what the BLS calls a modified Laspeyres aggregate price index (Moulton, 1996) , with base year 0 and reference consumption patterns surveyed at τ . 
